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I N S T I T U T E F O R E C O N O M I C A N A L Y S I S (C S I C)
 Abstract
A buyer with downward sloping demand faces a
number of unit-supply sellers. This paper
characterizes optimal auctions in this setting. For the
symmetric case, a uniform auction (with price equal
to lowest rejected offer) is optimal when
complemented with reserve prices for different
quantities acquired. For asymmetric sellers, the
optimal distortions are familiar. The problem is
similar to the third-degree discriminating
monopsonist problem, just as in the unit (flat)
demand case (Bulow-Roberts, 1989), and when the
number of sellers (and the demand) grows their
outcomes approach at the speed of the law of large
numbers.
 Key words
Auctions, monopsony.
 Resumen
Un comprador con una curva de demanda descen-
dente enfrenta un cierto número de compradores con
ofertas unitarias. El artículo caracteriza la subasta
eficiente en este contexto. Para el caso simétrico,
una subasta uniforme (con precio igual a la mejor
oferta rechazada) es óptima cuando está comple-
mentada con precios de reserva diferentes en fun-
ción de las cantidades adquiridas. Para vendedores
asimétricos, las distorsiones óptimas son las usuales.
El problema es similar al de un monopsonista discri-
minador, exctamente como en el caso de demanda
plana (unitaria) (véase Bulow-Roberts, 1989), y
cuando el número de vendedores y la demanda cre-
cen, sus resultados se aproximan a la velocidad de la
ley de los grandes números.
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1. Introduction
IN this paper we analyze the optimal mechanism (procurement auction)
for a buyer with downward sloping demand that faces a set of privately infor-
med, capacity constrained sellers. We then analyze the relationship between
this optimal procurement auction and the classical model of monopsony.
We also study how this relationship gets tighter when the number of sellers
is large (or their size is small).
Optimal auctions for a seller facing several potential buyers or, equi-
valently, a buyer facing several potential sellers, have been widely studied.
For instance, assume a buyer faces N potential suppliers, each of whom
can provide a unit of some good at some privately known cost. Assume the
sellers have private, independent costs, and the buyer’s valuation of each
of (at most) K ≤ N units is some given constant. Then the surplus maximi-
zing (incentive compatible) procurement mechanism or auction consists
of acquiring one unit from the K sellers whose “virtual cost” (some trans-
formation of their cost involving the idiosyncratic probability distributions
of these costs) is lowest, provided they are below the buyer’s unit valua-
tion. In the symmetric case, where all sellers’ costs are i.i.d., this is equiva-
lent to buying from each of the K lowest cost sellers whose cost is below
some reserve price (see Myerson 1981, and Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1988).
For this same case, a simple Kth +1 price auction implements this optimal
mechanism. In this auction, sellers bid simultaneously, but there is a hig-
hest acceptable price. Then (up to) the K lowest bidders supply one unit
at a price equal to either the highest unsuccessful bid or the reserve price,
whichever is lower. Another way to describe this auction mechanism is as
follows: the buyer announces a (flat) demand curve, then sellers make
their price offers, which are ordered from lowest to highest to construct a
supply function. Then the price and the quantity are determined by cros-
sing these two curves (with price equal to the highest equilibrium price, if
there are more than one).
This interpretation of the optimal auction as a market outcome is not
arbitrary. Indeed, Bulow and Roberts (1989) have shown that the problem
of designing an optimal auction for a buyer (seller in their case) is parallel
to the (third-degree discriminating) monopsony (monopoly in their case)
license allocation and performance in telecomunications markets
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pricing problem 1. Indeed, we can interpret probability as quantity, and re-
present each seller as a separate market, where the inverse supply function
at each quantity below 1 (capacity) is the inverse of the cost distribution eva-
luated at a quantile equal to that quantity. Then the optimal reserve price
for each seller is the price at which marginal expenditure in the correspon-
ding market crosses the (flat) demand of the buyer. When demand is flat,
the monopsonist faces separated markets 2. When sellers are symmetric
(markets are identical), of course, third-degree discrimination would be
equivalent to non-discriminating 3.
The first thing we do in this paper is to extend this analysis to allow
for downward sloping demand functions. Thus, we assume that the (margi-
nal) buyer’s willingness to pay for the kth unit may be decreasing in k. We
start by analyzing the equilibrium of a generalization of the Kth +1 price auc-
tion. In this generalized auction, the buyer announces a vector of reserve
prices. This can be thought of as a demand (step) function. Then sellers bid
simultaneously. The bids are ordered from lowest to highest, and this supply
function is crossed to the announced demand function to determine price
and quantity. (Again, when there is more than one equilibrium price the
price is the highest of them.) Given a demand function, sellers have as a
(weakly) dominant strategy to bid their true cost. Then the buyer’s optimal
reserve prices (steps of her demand function) are obtained by equating the
“virtual cost” (cost plus inverse of the hazard rate) with the buyer’s true wi-
llingness to pay for additional units.
Next we characterize optimal auctions allowing for asymmetries, and
show that the generalized Kth +1 price auction is indeed an optimal auction
for the symmetric case. For the asymmetric case, the buyer computes seller-
specific reserve price vectors (demand curves). For each seller, these vectors
are obtained as in our Kth +1 price auction. Thus, if sellers have different
roberto burguet verde
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1. Bulow and Roberts carry out their analysis in a monopoly setting. We choose to analyze the
monopsony case. In an acution setting, it is perhaps easier to picture decreasing willingness to pay
than increasing opportunity cost for additional units. Nevertheless, it should be clear than both
their analysis and the present paper apply to both cases. Thus, we will translate Bulow and Ro-
berts’ results to the monopsony case, when we refer to their results later.
2. In the auction case, however there is a linkage through the fact that the buyer’s demand func-
tion becomes vertical above some quantity. Thus, when this “capacity constraint” binds, i.e., when
there are more sellers with costs below the reserve price than units the buyer demands, then the
buyer buys from sellers in ascending order of their marginal expenditure.
3. The parallel between markets models and auctions has been investigated beyond the mono-
poly case. See for example McAfee (1993), Peters (1997), and Burguet and Sakovics (1999).
cost distributions (and therefore hazard rates), their reserve price vectors
will indeed be different. Then acquisitions are determined in sequence fo-
llowing the order of virtual cost: if k units have been assigned already (to the
k sellers with lowest “virtual cost”) then the kth +1 unit will be acquired from
the seller with kth +1 lowest “virtual cost”, if this is lower than the buyer’s va-
luation for the kth +1 unit, i.e., provided the cost of the seller is below the kth +1
reserve price in his vector.
Both for the symmetric and the asymmetric cases, we then provide a
market interpretation of these results that follows the lines of Bulow and
Roberts (1989). For the monopsonist, the main difference introduced by a
downward sloping demand function is that markets are not separated
even if the buyer can third-degree discriminate. Nevertheless, the optimal
pricing rule for the monopsonist satisfies that, given the quantities traded
in other markets, the marginal expenditure in any particular market is
equal to the buyer’s marginal willingness to pay. This is how the optimal
auction determines trade, when again we interpret probability as quantity.
Just as in the monopsony pricing problem, the main change with respect
to the flat demand case is that markets are not separated, and then the
trade possibilities cannot be determined without reference to other mar-
kets (sellers).
The last goal of this paper is to investigate an additional question
about the relationship between the monopsony and the optimal auction
models. This is whether the former can be thought of as a limiting case (for
sufficiently large numbers of traders) of the latter. In other words, whether
the fact that the single buyer confronts privately informed sellers becomes
of no relevance when the number of sellers (that is, their size relative to the
market) is sufficiently large. Or put in other terms, whether as aggregate un-
certainty vanishes, we recover the monopsony pricing model, and then set-
ting a price is just as good for the buyer as designing the best of mecha-
nisms 4. We show that this is indeed the case. Furthermore, we investigate
the speed of convergence. Prices, quantities, and consumer surplus all con-
verge at the speed of the law of large numbers.
The paper is structured as follows. The model is described in the next
section. In Section 3 we study the Kth +1 price auction for the symmetric
case. In Section 4 we extend the results on revenue equivalence and optimal
procurement with downward sloping demand: more simple economics
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4. We ask this question in the symmetric seller case. If the number of “types” of sellers remains
bounded as the number of sellers gets large, the parallel between the (third-degree discrimina-
ting) monopsonist and the optimal auction extends easily.
auctions for the downward sloping case. Section 5 then interprets these re-
sults in the light of the monopsony pricing model. Section 6 analyzes the
convergence properties when the number of sellers becomes large. Section
7 concludes.
roberto burguet verde
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2. The model
EACH of N sellers can supply a unit of an homogeneous, indivisible good.
Supplier i’s unit cost, ci, is the realization of a random variable distributed
with positive density fi and c.d.f. Fi in [0, 1]. Costs are therefore independent
and identically distributed, and the realization ci is seller i’s private informa-
tion, although Fi is common knowledge. Sellers face a unique buyer with a
demand function that can be described by the ordered vector of valuations
for additional units, v = (v1, v2, ...,vM), where vi ≥ vj for all i < j, vi ∈ [0,1],
and M ≤ N. All agents are risk neutral. Also, we assume regularity of Fi. That
is, we assume that
Fi (c)Ji (c) = c + ———fi (c)
is strictly increasing for all i.
procurement with downward sloping demand: more simple economics
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3. Auction for the
symmetric case
FOR the moment, assume sellers are symmetric. That is, Fi= F for all i (and 
Ji = J for all i). Consider a simple auction format, where the buyer organizes
the transaction as follows. She announces a demand schedule, that is, an or-
dered list r = (r1, r2, ..., rM), and asks for simultaneous bids by all sellers. Se-
llers’ bids b =(b1, b2, ..., bN) are ordered from lowest to highest, and then this
supply schedule is crossed to the demand schedule r. That is, let k be such
that bk ≤ rk, and bk+1 > rk+1, where rM +1 ≡ 0. Then k units are traded at a price
min{rk, bk+1}. In other words, trade would be Walrasian for the demand and
supply functions r and b, respectively.
Notice that given this pricing rule, a seller’s bid may affect whether
the seller is scheduled to produce or not, but it never affects the price that
this seller receives. This implies the following preliminary result.
Lemma 1 For each seller, bidding true cost is a (weakly) dominant strategy.
Thus the supply function will be the true supply function for any de-
mand function r that the buyer announces. Given that sellers will bid their
true costs, we can write the buyer’s expected surplus for a given demand
function r as follows:
M k N
Eπ (r; v) = ∑ {(∑ vi – k ⋅ rk)( ) F(rk)k [1 – F(rk)]N–k + 
k=1 i=1
k
rk k N–1∫ (∑ vi – k ⋅ c)( ) Nf(c) F(c)k [1 – F(c)]N–k–1 dc }.
rk+1i=1
k
Then the buyer’s optimal choice of r maximizes the above expression.
roberto burguet
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Proposition 2. The optimal demand function for the buyer r*(v) is given by
J(rk) = vk.
N F(rk) k( ) F(rk)k–1 [1 – F(rk)]N–k { –k ———— + k (∑ vi – k · rk) –k F(rk) i=1
N–1k (k–1)– (∑ vi – (k – 1)rk ) ——— N} = 0
i=1 N( k )
and the result follows since
N–1( k–1 )
———— N = k
N( k )
Notice that rk(v) depends only on vk. Also notice that r*(v) is decrea-
sing, since J, and therefore J –1, is strictly increasing. That is, r*(v) is a de-
mand function for any v. Also notice that the demand function for the bu-
yer is somehow independent of the size of the market. In this sense, if we
replicate the market by, say, splitting the size of units in half (and multipl-
ying the number of suppliers by two), the equilibrium demand function
would still be the same.
Proposition 2 generalizes well-known results for the single-unit or flat-
demand cases where a single reserve price is optimal for any amount pur-
chased. Here, however, the willingness to pay for additional units is decrea-
sing with the size of the purchase. Accordingly, higher amounts are
purchased only if that can be done at lower prices.
procurement with downward sloping demand: more simple economics
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4. Optimal Auctions
WE next consider the problem of designing an optimal selling mechanism
for the above problem. We return to the general, asymmetric setting. Deno-
te by c = (c1, c2, ..., cN). Also, denote by F, and f the distribution and density
of c and by F–i and f–i the marginal distribution and density of c–i.
Using the Revelation Principle, a trading mechanism or “auction” in
this setting can be characterized by some lists of functions, {Xi, Pi}i=1,2,...,N,
where Xi: [0, 1]N → {0, 1}, and Pi: [0, 1]N → R. Xi(c) should be interpreted as
the probability that seller i sells one unit if the cost realizations are c. In ge-
neral, we could consider random allocation, so that this value could take
any real number between 0 and 1. However, as usual, nothing is gained with
this generalization. Pi(c) should be interpreted as the (expected, if you wish)
payment that seller i receives if the cost realizations are c. Once the mecha-
nism is given, we can define a new collection of functions, {xi, pi}i=1,2,...,N, whe-
re xi: [0, 1] → [0, 1], with xi(ci) = Ec–i [Xi(c–i , ci)], and pi: [0, 1] → R, with
pi(ci) = Ec–i [Pi(c–i , ci)]. A necessary condition for the mechanism {Xi , Pi} to
be incentive compatible is that 5
p’i – x’i ci = 0,
which, by integrating, implies the well known expression of revenue equiva-
lence
1
pi(ci) = cixi(ci) + ∫ xi(z)dzi + Ri(1),
ci
roberto burguet
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5. We assume that the functions are differentiable. As usual, this is only to save in notation and
space.
where Ri(1) =pi(1) – 1xi(1) are the rents for seller i with valuation 1 (which
in the optimal mechanism will be set to zero). As might be expected, two
mechanisms that assign the purchases in the same way (and leave zero rents
to a seller with the highest possible realization of cost) will also result in the
same expected payment for the buyer and the same expected (conditional
on their cost) rents for the sellers. Using the above result, we can substitute
the incentive compatibility (revenue equivalence) equation on the buyer’s
objective function (the expected consumer surplus), 
∑i Xi(c)∫ c ( ∑ vk – ∑i Pi(c) ) dF(c) – ∑i Ri(1),k=1
so that this objective function can be written as
∑i Xi(c) Fi(ci)∫ c ( ∑ vk – ∑i ( ci + ——— ) Xi(c) ) dF(c) – ∑i Ri(1).k=1 fi(ci)
By simply inspecting this expression, we observe that, for any realiza-
tion of c, once the number of units to be bought decided, ∑i Xi(c), the optimal
choice for the buyer is to buy (make Xi(c) = 1) from the sellers with lowest 
Fi(ci)values of Ji(ci) = ci + ———. This is the well known result for unit auctions. fi(ci)
But here the number of units bought is decided by “equating” the marginal
willingness to pay, vk , with the corresponding kth order statistic of the Ji(ci)’s
realizations! Any mechanism that induces this allocation (with zero rents for
sellers with cost 1) is an optimal mechanism.
Notice that in the symmetric case (when J(c) is a monotone function),
the kth order statistic of the Ji(ci)’s corresponds with the kth order statistic of
the ci’s. Thus, the auction we presented in Section 3 is indeed an optimal
mechanism for the buyer. When sellers are asymmetric, however, the opti-
mal auction discriminates in favor of (ex-ante) weaker sellers, just as the op-
timal auction for the single object case. We next turn to the economic inter-
pretation of our results.
procurement with downward sloping demand: more simple economics
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5. Simple economics
WHAT is the relationship between the above one buyer optimal auction
and the classical monopsony pricing model? One difference is that in our
model the supply function is random. The position of the supply curve at
the kth unit is the realization of the k—N quantile of the sample of components
of the random variable with distribution F. This is a random variable itself.
The second difference is that our buyer does not fix the transaction price,
but rather the demand to confront with the (ex-post realized) supply.
In a celebrated and influential paper, Bulow and Roberts (1989) have
shown that despite these differences, these two problems are somehow ho-
momorphic for the case of flat demand. Indeed, the problem faced by the
single buyer in designing an optimal auction is parallel to the pricing deci-
sion of a third-degree discriminating monopsonist where the supply in each
of the N markets (one for each seller) is given by the cost distribution of the
corresponding seller. That is, what is probability is interpreted as quantity,
when constructing a supply (marginal cost) function from a probability dis-
tribution on costs. There are two key points that make this parallel. First,
the optimal auction incorporate seller-specific reserve prices (maximum
costs), so that trade takes place with one particular seller only if the cost of
this seller is below some value strictly lower than the (constant) unit valua-
tion of the buyer. These reserve prices are set at the level where willingness
to pay intersects marginal expenditure for that seller/market, just as in the
third-degree discriminating monopsonist. Second, the buyer buys from se-
llers whose realized marginal expenditure is lowest. This second feature is
the result of a vertical portion of the demand (if M > N it is irrelevant) that
may introduce some link between otherwise separated markets.
It is convenient to explain briefly the parallel between prices and re-
serve prices. Consider a symmetric case, in which case one (but not the only
one) optimal mechanism is to conduct an auction and setting the price
equal to the minimum rejected bid or the (common) reserve price, whiche-
roberto burguet
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ver is lower. Reserve prices are not prices, since sellers will in general receive
a higher payment, conditional upon selling. However, reserve prices are the
prices when (and only when) the marginal seller faces no competition from
other sellers. That is, when given the bids of other sellers, this particular se-
ller sells if, and only if her bid is below the reserve price. In this case, mar-
kets are separated since “demand constraints” do not bind, and then the
problem faced by the buyer with respect to each of the sellers is indeed that
of a buyer that makes a take it or leave it offer. This problem is homomorp-
hic to that of a monopsonist facing a supply schedule given by the distribu-
tion of cost of the seller.
The (lack of) separation of markets is the main difference that down-
ward sloped demands introduce. Yet, the parallelism between the third-de-
gree discriminating monopsonist pricing and the buyer’s auction design
problems can be extended to this case. When a monopsonist demand is
downward sloping, her markets are not separated even if she can price dis-
criminate 6. Indeed, her residual demand curve depends on trade in other
markets. Nevertheless, given the quantity traded in other markets, the solu-
tion for the monopsonist is to equate marginal expenditure in any given
market to her residual demand. Next we show that this is how reserve prices
are determined in the optimal mechanism characterized in the previous
section.
Indeed, given the (indirect) supply function for a particular market i, 
Pis(qi) = Fi–1(qi),
we can invert it to obtain Qis = Fi(Pis). The monopsonist’s optimal choice of
trade qi , given the quantity traded in the rest of markets Q–i, results from
equating her willingness to pay (residual demand) vQ–i+qi with the marginal
expenditure,
d(Pis(qi) · qi) dPis(qi)————— = ———— qi + Pis(qi),dqi dqi
where 
procurement with downward sloping demand: more simple economics
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6. In the monopoly case, markets are not separated when the marginal cost is increasing.
dPis(qi) 1———— = ————— .
dqi fi(Pis(qi))
That is, the monopsonist’s optimal choice is given by
qivQ–i+qi = ———— + Pi
s(qi),fi(Pis(qi))
which in terms of Ps, and recalling that Pis(qi) = Fi–1(qi), can be written as
Fi(Pis)vQ–i+qi = ——— + Pi
s = Ji(Pis).fi(Pis)
This is precisely the way the optimal mechanism characterized in the
previous section sets reserve prices. Indeed, if the quantity traded with other
sellers is Q–i = k – 1, then the buyer will consider buying from seller i only if
her cost (supply) is below Ji–1(vk). When indeed the cost realizations for
exactly k – 1 other sellers j’s are such that their respective costs are below
Jj–1(vk), the buyer will acquire k units if (and only if) seller i’s cost is below
Ji–1(vk).
The second, perhaps less interesting parallelism between optimal auc-
tions and monopsonist pricing models that we have mentioned also extends
to the downward demand case. Indeed, if more than k sellers have a cost be-
low their respective value of Jj–1(vk), but less than k + 1 have a cost below
Jj–1(vk+1), then k units are traded with the k sellers whose realized Jj(cj) are
the lowest. As we have just seen, Jj(cj) represents the marginal expenditure
in market j, and therefore this is the same criterion for the flat demand
case.
roberto burguet verde
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6. Large markets: the
convergence
properties of
optimal auctions
LET us now return to the symmetric case, where third-degree discrimina-
tion coincides with no discrimination at all. In the previous sections we have
discussed how the “logic” of monopsony pricing is the same behind optimal
auctions. Despite this parallel, the trade (quantity and price) realized in the
optimal auction described in Section 3 does not coincide with the trade of a
monopsonist facing the realized supply. The divergence is due to the fact
that the buyer does not know where exactly the supply function lies 7. As the
number of sellers becomes large, the uncertainty about where the supply
function exactly lies should disappear. Thus we might suspect that the diffe-
rence in trade between a model of monopsony pricing and the auction mo-
del should also disappear. This is what we present in this section. That is, we
show that the monopsony pricing model, which shares the logic with the op-
timal auction, is itself a model of how information is aggregated in our auc-
tion model.
Firstly, in order to simplify in notation and give a clear meaning to the
convergence criterion, assume the demand function v is the vector of order
statistics from M independent realizations of some random variable with dis-
tribution G and density g in [0, 1]. Of course, since r is announced, these rea-
procurement with downward sloping demand: more simple economics
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7. The buyer, as opposed to the monopsonist in the pricing model, can in principle use a wider
set of instruments, and not just a price. However, the mere asymmetry of information makes this
difference irrelevant.
lizations need not be private information for the buyer. Also, we do not lose
further generality by assuming M = N. We will be interested in the conver-
gence properties of the outcome of this game when the number of sellers
and units demanded, N, gets large. (Alternatively, when the size of sellers
gets small.)
For any q ∈ (0, 1) and integer N, let kq, N be the largest integer such
that kq, N ≤ qN. Then, we can define the q-quantile (ordering from largest to
smallest) of the sample of size N of valuations, vN = (v1, v2, ..., vN), as vkq, N .
This is a random variable. As N gets large, 
L q(1 – q)N ½ (vkq ) – G
–1 (1 – q) → N (0, ——————)g(G–1(1 – q))2
Likewise, the q-quantile (in the usual ascending order) of the sample
J(cN) of sellers’ costs transformed by the monotone, continuous function J,
defined in a similar way, J(ckq, N), is a random variable, and as N gets large,
L q(1 – q)N ½ (J(ckq, N) – J(F–1(q))) → N (0, ——————).f(J(F–1 (q)))2
Now, for a monopsonist market with “demand” given by Qd = N (1 –
G(P)) and supply given by Qs = NF(P), the monopsonist maximizes surplus
by buying an amount Q such that
Q Q
G–1 (1 – —) = J (F–1 (—)).N N
Let q * be the unique solution for Q—
N
in the equation above. From the
convergence properties of quantiles presented above, it is immediate that
the realized trade should get infinitely close to q *N with probability infini-
tely close to 1, as N is large. The next proposition shows that this is indeed
the case, and also the speed at which trade approaches this quantity.
Proposition 3. The per seller quantity traded in the optimal auction with N sellers
(and N-demand), qoN, converges in probability to q *. The sequence qoN is at most of or-
der n½ in probability, Op(n½).
Proof. Since both N ½ (vkq, N – G
–1(1 – q)) and N ½ (J(ckq, N) – J(F
–1(q)))
converge in distribution, they are both Op(1) (i.e., are at most of order N 0 in
probability). Thus both , (vkq, N – G
–1(1 – q)) and (J(ckq, N) – J(F
–1(q))) are
roberto burguet verde
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Op(N –½), and since G–1(1 – q) and J(F–1(q)) are non stochastic, this means
that both vkq, N and J(ckq, N) are Op(N
–½). Substracting one sequence from the
other, we have that (vkq, N – J(ckq, N) converges in probability as well (and is
Op(N –½)). That is, there exists a scalar b such that ∀ε > 0, Pr [|(vkq, N – J(ckq, N)
– b| < ε] → 1 as N → ∞. Given the convergence in distribution of N ½ (vkq, N –
G–1(1 – q)) and N ½ (J(ckq, N) – J(F
–1(q))), this value b could be nothing but
G–1(1 – Q—
N
– J(F–1(Q—
N
)). Thus, the realized trade qoN converges in probability
to q *. This proves the first part of the proposition. Now, to prove that qoN is
Op(n–½), we just prove by contradiction that N ½ (qoN – q *) →
p
0. Assume 
otherwise, that is, assume ∃ε > 0 and δ > 0 such that ∀N’ ∃N > N’ such that
Pr [|N ½ (qoN – q *)| > ε] > δ. This implies that
ε ε
Pr[qoN > q * + ——] + Pr[qoN < q * – —— > ε] > δN ½ N ½
That is,
Pr[vk(q*+
N ½
——ε ), N – J(ck(q*+
N ½
——ε ), N) > 0] + 
Pr[vk(q*–
N ½
——ε ), N – J(ck(q*–
N ½
——ε ), N) < 0] > δ
To shorten notation, let us define ∆(q) = G–1(1 – q) – J(F–1(q)). Re-
member that ∆(q *) = 0, and that the random variable N ½ (vkq, N – J(ckq, N)) →
L
N (N ½∆(q), σ2(q)), where σ2(q) is constant in N. Thus, for large enough N,
the distribution of vkq, N – J(ckq, N) is arbitrarily close to the normal distribu-
tion with a expectation ∆(q) and variance N –1σ2(q). Then, vk(q*+
N ½
——ε ), N – 
J(ck(q*+
N ½
——ε ), N) is arbitrarily close to a normal distribution with density
N ½ N (x – ∆(q* –
N½
——ε ))2
f(x) = ————————— exp [ – ——————————],
σ(q* –
N½
——ε ) 2π 2σ(q* –
N½
——ε )
which can be written
f(x) = [Φ(∆(q*), N –1σ2 (q* – N½——ε ))] Θ(N, ε),
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where Φ(µ, σ2) is the density of a normal random variable with expectation
µ and variance σ2 and
N
Θ(N, ε) = exp [ – ———————— 2σ2 (q* –
N½
——ε )
{ (∆(q*) – ∆(q* – N½——ε ))2
– 2(∆(q*) – ∆(q* – N½——ε ))(x – ∆(q*))}]
As N gets large, and applying L’Hôpital rule, Θ(N, ε) converges to 
d(∆(z))
N ½(∆(q*) – ∆(q* – N½——ε )) → ε ———— |z=q* –
N½
——ε
,
dz
which is bounded away from zero (and independent of x). Also,
N (∆(q*) – ∆(q* – N½——ε )) (x – ∆(q*)) → 0.
Therefore, f(x) is (arbitrarily close to) proportional to the density of a
normal random variable with expectation ∆(q*) = 0 and a variance arbitra-
rily close to zero. Therefore Pr[vk(q*+
N ½
——ε ), N – J(ck(q*+
N ½
——ε ), N) > 0] approaches 
zero as N converges to zero. Similarly, Pr[vk(q*+
N ½
——ε ), N – J(ck(q*+
N ½
——ε ), N) > 0]
converges to zero, and this contradiction shows that indeed, qoN is Op(n½).
Corollary 4. The per seller consumer surplus converges to that of a monopsonist fa-
cing supply Qs = NF(P) and is Op(n½).
Proof. For a given realization of vN and cN, the realized consumer sur-
plus is simply
NqoN
CS = ∫ (vkx, N – poN) dx
0
where poN is the realized price. Then, if we denote by CS * the surplus of a
monopsonist facing Qs = NF(P), we have 
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CS* – CS
Nq*
(vkx, N – p*)————— = q* (p* – poN) + ∫ ————— dx,N
NqoN
N
and the absolute value of the second term in the right hand side is bounded
by |(q* – qoN) + (q* – qoN) (p* – poN)|, which converges to zero and is Op(n½),
just as the first term.
The speed of convergence we have obtained is simply the speed of
convergence in the law of large numbers. This is slow as compared, for ins-
tance, to the speed of convergence of prices and quantities in double auc-
tions to those of the competitive equilibrium. The latter is Op(n) (see Rusti-
chini, Satterthwaite, and Williams, 1994). It is interesting to understand this
difference. In a double auction, (many) buyers and sellers submit their bid-
ask prices and an auctioneer determines trade and prices at which the mar-
ket clears. Thus the only divergence between prices and quantities traded
and those that correspond to the competitive equilibrium arises from misre-
presentation (difference between bids/asks and opportunity costs/willing-
ness to pay). As the number of agents grow, both the probability of influen-
cing the price and the maximum amount of this effect converge to zero.
That is, the slack both in manipulating the “order” in the demand/supply
schedule and the “share” of the surplus that can be retained converge to
zero. As a result, the misrepresentation converges to zero at a speed double
the one of the law of large numbers.
In this paper, there is no auctioneer to cross demand and supply. The
divergence between the price and quantities traded and those that would be
traded if the buyer knew the realized supply schedule all depend on the ina-
bility of the buyer to know the “order” of sellers with certainty. That is, to
know where exactly lies the k-quantile of the supply function. This difficulty
disappears only at a speed given by the law of large numbers. But no para-
llel convergence due to the relatively smaller size the agents occurs. The bu-
yer remains large relative to the market as the market grows large.
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7. Concluding
remarks
A uniform-price auction is optimal for a buyer with downward sloping de-
mand facing symmetric, unit-supply sellers. The buyer announces a vector
of reserve prices that determine a demand function. Given the sellers’ bids,
price and quantities are determined so that the market clears. The vector of
reserve prices is determined by equating willingness to pay for each additio-
nal unit with “virtual cost”, just as in the unit (or flat demand) case.
We have characterized the optimal mechanism for asymmetric sellers
as well. Asymmetry between sellers implies that reserve prices are personali-
zed for each seller. Acquisitions are then decided following the order of per-
sonalized “virtual costs”.
We have discussed the economic interpretation of optimal auctions
with downward sloping demand in line with that of Bulow and Roberts
(1989). Here too, the problem for the buyer is similar to that of a third de-
gree discriminating monopsonist. The difference with the unit (or flat) de-
mand is that markets are not separated. Finally, we have obtained conver-
gence of the optimal mechanism to the monopsony (price) solution. The
speed of convergence of prices, quantities, and surplus sharing coincides
with that of the law of large numbers.
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